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Listening to Loan Officers: 
The Impact of Commercial 
Credit Standards on 
Lending and Output
hen the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
eased monetary policy on October 15, 1998, it noted the 
“growing caution by lenders and unsettled conditions in 
financial markets more generally. . . .” Sharply higher spreads 
on commercial paper and corporate bonds made it clear that 
the U.S. markets were unsettled, but how could policymakers 
tell if lenders were growing more cautious? Commercial bank 
loans are rarely traded, so loan rates are not instantly 
observable. Moreover, the “price” of commercial bank credit 
extends beyond the interest rate; bank loan officers set 
standards that firms must clear even before the rate is 
negotiated. These standards are decided in thousands of bank 
offices across the country, so how can the Federal Reserve tell if 
lenders are growing cautious? For that matter, how can we tell 
if banks are “throwing caution to the wind” and easing 
standards? We ask. Once each quarter, participants in the 
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey are 
asked whether their standards for making commercial loans 
have “tightened” or “eased” since the previous quarter. Loan 
officers at approximately sixty large domestic banks across the 
United States participate in the survey.
Although we praise the survey in the end, there certainly are 
reasons to doubt it. The survey is entirely qualitative, for one: 
respondents provide opinions, not hard numbers. The small 
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• The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey offers information useful in 
forecasting commercial loan growth and 
overall economic activity.
• Statistical analysis reveals a strong correlation 
between loan officers’ reports of tighter credit 
standards and slowdowns in commercial 
lending and output. 
• Reported changes in credit standards can 
also help predict narrower measures of 
business activity, including inventory 
investment and industrial production.
• The chain of events following a tightening 
of standards resembles a “credit crunch”: 
Commercial loans plummet, output falls, 
and the federal funds rate is lowered.
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sample size is another concern: with more than 8,000 banks in 
the United States, can sixty bankers tell us anything useful 
about aggregate lending? Reporting bias is yet another concern; 
respondents in general may try to please surveyors, but the bias 
with this survey may be more severe because the loan officers 
work at banks that are likely supervised by the Federal Reserve. 
Loan officers who suspect, albeit wrongly, that their input will 
be used for supervisory purposes may shade their responses 
accordingly. 
 Because of these concerns, this article examines the value of 
the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey in predicting both 
lending and output.1 We find that the changes in commercial 
credit standards reported by loan officers are indeed linked to 
aggregate loan growth. Commercial lending by U.S. banks 
slows substantially following reports of tighter standards, even 
after we control for other factors that might affect growth. Loan 
officers not only report accurately, they provide us with 
information that we could not infer from other measures of 
credit availability, such as loan rates, loan growth itself, or the 
mix of bank loans and other sources of credit. Changes in 
credit standards also help to predict economic growth and 
narrower measures of business activity such as inventory 
investment, a notoriously unforecastable variable that is closely 
tied to the banking sector. 
In the end, we estimate a system of equations—a vector 
autoregression (VAR)—that enables us to isolate and quantify 
the impact of a shock to credit standards on lending output. 
Our VAR is an off-the-shelf model of the economy with two 
additional variables: commercial loans extended by banks and 
the change in commercial credit standards reported by bank 
loan officers. A shock to credit standards and its aftermath very 
much resemble a “credit crunch”: Lenders tighten standards 
very abruptly, but ease up only gradually. Commercial loan 
volume at banks plummets immediately after the shock and 
does not bottom out until lenders start to ease standards again. 
Output also falls shortly after the tightening in standards. The 
federal funds rate, which we identify with the stance of 
monetary policy, declines. 
In the next section, we describe the Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey and relate the motivation for the survey to 
the credit “availability doctrine” of the 1950s and to more 
recent theories of quantity credit rationing. We then examine 
the correlation between the changes in commercial credit 
standards reported by loan officers in the survey and various 
measures of credit availability, including lending itself. 
We follow this discussion with a look at the link between 
standards and economic activity and an analysis of the impact 
of a “shock” to standards in a multiple-equation framework. 
The Survey: Background 
and Motivation
The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending 
Practices, as it is officially known, was unveiled in 1967. In its 
most recent incarnation, the survey includes approximately 
twenty core questions about the supply of and demand for 
various types of credit, including commercial credit. Apart 
from these regular questions, the survey includes ad hoc 
questions about disruptions and trends in credit markets. The 
sample includes about sixty domestic banks, usually the largest 
in each of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts. Banks are added 
or replaced as needed. “Megamergers” between very large U.S. 
banks in recent decades, for example, have necessitated 
frequent changes in the sample. The response rate of lenders is 
very near 100 percent.2 
In contrast to the more quantitative survey on commercial 
loan rates, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey is, as its 
name suggests, more qualitative.3 Loan officers are essentially 
asked whether their standards for approving commercial credit 
have tightened or eased since the quarter before: 
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit 
standards for approving loan applications for C&I 
[commercial and industrial] loans or credit lines—
excluding those to finance mergers and acquisitions—
changed? 1) tightened considerably, 2) tightened 
somewhat, 3) remained basically unchanged, 
4) eased somewhat, 5) eased considerably.
Except for a hiatus in the 1980s, when the question was 
dropped, and apart from minor changes in wording and 
emphasis in earlier years, the basic question-and-answer options 
have been more or less the same over various eras of the survey. 
Once each quarter, participants in the 
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey are asked whether their 
standards for making commercial loans 
have “tightened” or “eased” since the 
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Changes in Commercial Credit Standards 
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Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
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1967-77.  In terms of sample size and constancy, these were 
the golden years. The sample numbered 121 large U.S. banks, 
nearly twice the size of the sample today. Sample coverage was 
also relatively constant, as the bank mergers that cause frequent 
changes in the sample these days were yet to come. The 
standards question was virtually identical to the question 
above. The answer options differed only trivially in their 
wording: “much” instead of “considerably,” for example, and 
“firmer” instead of “tightened.”
1978-84.  To account for the growing role of the prime 
lending rate in allocating bank credit, the question on 
standards was essentially divided in two in 1978. Lenders were 
first asked to report changes in standards for approving loans 
at the prime rate. A second question asked about standards for 
loans at “spreads above” prime. The answer options for each 
question were not changed.  The survey was expanded to 
include a sample of foreign banks during this period, and the 
number of domestic banks in the survey was reduced to sixty, 
about the same as today. 
1984-90.  Questions on commercial credit standards were 
dropped altogether during this period. With the deregulation 
of deposit and other interest rates in the early 1980s, 
policymakers and their staffs may have presumed that bankers 
would rely more on unfettered interest rates and less on 
standards in allocating loans among borrowers. 
1990 to fourth-quarter 1998.  The standards questions were 
revived because of concerns about a possible credit crunch in 
the spring of 1990. The question is still divided in two, as in 
1978-84, but the division these days is by firm size; lenders are 
asked to report separately on standards for small firms (with 
annual sales under $50 million) versus large and middle-sized 
firms. 
The changes in standards reported by loan officers are 
pieced together in Chart 1.  For the 1990s, we use the standards 
for loans to middle-sized and large firms (as opposed to small 
firms) on the theory that the former matter more in terms of 
aggregate lending conditions. The choice is largely immaterial, 
however, as the correlation between the two series was 0.96. 
For the years 1978-84, when the question on standards distin-
guished between loans at prime and loans above prime, we use 
the average of the responses to the two questions.
Plotted in the chart is the net percentage tightening: the 
number of loan officers reporting tightening standards less 
the number reporting easing divided by the total number 
reporting.4 As Schreft and Owens (1991) noted, loan officers 
almost never reported a net easing of standards over the 1967-
77 period; if the reported changes were summed, credit would 
have been extremely tight by the end of the period. This curious 
tendency to report tighter standards, at least in the early years, 
raises concerns about reporting bias; bank loan officers may be 
loath to ever tell the Federal Reserve that they are letting their 
standards fall.5 The first substantial easing of standards was not 
reported until the 1980s. Credit standards were indeed tight in 
the early 1990s, after the hiatus, suggesting that credit-crunch 
concerns may have been well founded. The last substantial 
tightening reported by lenders was in 1998, after the Russian 
default and financial deterioration in southeast Asia.
The Importance of Standards 
Why do monetary policymakers care about credit standards in 
the first place? Why not simply ask lenders to report loan rates 
and leave it at that? Because the market for credit may not 
operate like other markets, where prices do all the adjusting to 
keep the market cleared. For various reasons, loan rates may be 
secondary to standards of creditworthiness and other nonprice 
terms in the allocation of bank credit. 
During the years leading up to the survey, interest rates were 
held down by government-imposed ceilings or by the Federal 
With more than 8,000 banks in the United 
States, can sixty bankers tell us anything 
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Reserve’s efforts to support Treasury bond prices. The 
stickiness of loan rates gave rise to the availability doctrine in 
the 1950s—the idea that the quantity of credit available from 
banks mattered more (for spending) than the price. While the 
availability doctrine has waned, modern theories of “quantity” 
rationing also emphasize the primacy of nonprice terms in the 
allocation of credit among competing borrowers.6 The friction 
holding down interest rates in these theories is not government 
intervention, but the information and incentive problems that 
can gum up credit markets: adverse selection and moral hazard.  
By raising loan rates, lenders may drive off all but the least 
creditworthy applicants or elicit riskier behavior by borrowers. 
Rather than raising loan rates to curtail the supply of credit, 
lenders may tighten their standards and cut off credit to the 
marginal borrowers that do not meet the higher standards. In 
essence, credit markets may operate like a trendy night club in 
New York City : you have to clear the velvet rope before you pay 
the door charge. 
Despite this theory, there is surprisingly little evidence that 
the commercial standards reported by loan officers actually 
matter for lending and output. Schreft and Owens (1991) noted 
the frequent breaks in the series and some of the curious 
features of the reports, but they did not actually test whether 
standards were informative nevertheless. Duca and Garrett 
(1995) and McCarthy (1997) investigate whether bankers’ 
willingness to lend affects spending, but they focus on consumer 
credit standards and spending. 
The propensity of lenders to always report tightening, 
especially in the early years, makes one wonder whether lenders 
are just “talking tough” when they say they are tightening. The 
link between loan growth and standards reported by senior 
loan officers can tell us; if their actions match their words, and 
if the actions of lenders in the survey are representative, then 
reports of tighter standards should lead to slower commercial 
loan growth, all else equal.
Credit Standards and Loan Growth
Loan growth does indeed slow at times when loan officers 
report tightening standards (Chart 2). Following the tightening 
reported from 1973 to 1975, for example, loan growth slowed 
and eventually turned negative. The sharp tightening reported 
during the early 1990s was also followed by much slower loan 
growth. Lending grew relatively rapidly in the ensuing years as 
loan officers began to report less tightening and eventually 
eased standards. The more recent tightening reported in the 
summer of 1998 also preceded sharply slower loan growth in 
the first quarter of 1999. 
Table 1 confirms the negative relationship between 
standards and loan growth and shows that the changes in 
standards reported by loan officers are correlated with several 
other measures of credit availability as well. The correlation 
between loan growth and standards has been higher thus far in 
the 1990s, but it was also significant in the pre-1984 period.7 In 
both periods, the change in standards tends to play the leading 
Why do monetary policymakers care about 
credit standards in the first place? Why not 
simply ask lenders to report loan rates and 
leave it at that? Because the market for 
credit may not operate like other markets, 
where prices do all the adjusting to keep 
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role. The loan spread—the difference between commercial 
loan rates and the federal funds rate—tends to rise following 
reports of tighter standards, as we would expect if lenders are 
contracting credit. Here again, standards play the leading role. 
Changes in the “mix” of commercial paper and bank loans 
are also positively correlated with changes in standards. This 
mix variable was used in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) to 
identify shifts in the supply of bank loans relative to other 
sources of short-term credit. If loans become more expensive, 
owing to a monetary contraction, for instance, this mix tends 
to rise as the large firms that can borrow in the commercial 
paper market substitute paper for loans. Increases in the mix 
are also positively related to tightening credit standards, as 
Table 1 shows. This correlation is positive at both leads and 
lags, however, so we cannot say for sure whether standards lead 
the mix or vice versa. 
In contrast to the paper-loan mix, which measures relative 
quantities, the paper-bill spread measures relative prices. 
Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and others have found that this 
spread is a particularly good predictor of economic activity, 
with higher spreads signaling slower future growth. Although 
researchers have different theories as to why this spread is so 
informative, one hypothesis is that a rise in the paper-bill 
spread signals disturbances in credit markets. As Table 1 shows, 
the spread is positively correlated with commercial bank credit 
standards. The strongest correlation is contemporaneous, 
suggesting that bankers and investors in the commercial paper 
market are reacting to the same news. 
The last measure of credit availability in Table 1 comes from 
another survey, this one of firms. Once a quarter, a sample of 
small firms belonging to the National Federation of 
Independent Business is asked whether credit is “easier or 
harder” to get than it was in the previous quarter. As shown in 
the last column of the table, the net percentage of firms 
reporting easier credit availability falls as the net percentage of 
bankers reporting tightening standards rises. 
Although suggestive, these correlations hardly prove that 
the tighter standards reported by bankers actually reduce the 
Table 1
Changes in Commercial Credit Standards Reported by Bank Loan Officers 
and Measures of Credit Availability
Correlations at Various Leads and Lags
Standards 








c Paper-Bill Spread  t
d
Reports of Eased 
Credit  t
e
-4 -0.31*** -0.80*** 0.67*** 0.06*** 0.19*** -0.16***
-3 -0.36*** -0.74*** 0.70*** 0.01*** 0.13*** -0.15***
-2 -0.35*** -0.69*** 0.60*** 0.17*** 0.21*** -0.33***
-1 -0.17*** -0.56*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.39*** -0.40***
00 . 2 0 *** -0.29*** 0.38*** 0.14*** 0.49*** -0.31***
1 0.42*** -0.24*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.33*** -0.15***
2 0.27*** -0.16*** 0.08*** 0.32*** 0.19*** -0.08***
30 . 2 1 *** -0.02*** 0.02*** 0.40*** 0.15*** -0.02***
4 0.34*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.10***
Memo: 






Source: Data sources are in Table A2.
a Net percentage of domestic banks reporting a tightening of standards for commercial and industrial loans.
b Spread of the commercial loan rate over the federal funds rate.
c Mix = 100*(Nonfinancial CP outstanding/(Nonfinancial CP + C&I bank loans)).
d Spread = (Nonfinancial CP interest rate)-(T-bill interest rate). The spread was computed using six-month rates
until 1971 and three-month rates from 1971 to 1998.
e Net percentage of small firms reporting “easier” credit from the previous quarter.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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Net percentage of loan officers reporting
supply of bank credit. The problem with these pairwise 
correlations is that they fail to control for a second important 
determinant of loan growth: demand. Consider the 1990-91 
period: did lending contract during that period because 
bankers were tightening standards or simply because the 
recession over that period slowed the demand for loans?
In fact, loan officers do tend to report weaker demand for 
commercial loans at the same time that they report tightening 
standards (Chart 3).8 This correlation makes sense, especially 
when we consider the business cycle. Credit demand falls 
during contractions, at the same time that cautious bankers 
become less willing to lend. Firms demand more credit during 
expansions, and the good times may also make banks more 
willing to lend. To isolate the link between lending and credit 
standards, we use a regression equation to control for these 
multiple interactions between economic activity and the supply 
and demand for credit.
Regression Results 
We estimate a loan growth equation of the following form:
(1)     .
The dependent variable,  , is growth in commercial 
and industrial loans at U.S.-chartered banks over quarter t, 
expressed at an annual percentage rate.9   is the 
net percentage of loan officers reporting tightening standards 
for approving commercial loans to large and medium-sized 
firms. Both series are plotted in Chart 2.   is a vector of 
DLoanst ab S dards tan t1 – gDDt1 – et ++ + =
DLoanst
S dards tan t1 –
DDt1 –
other variables that may influence loan growth: the lagged 
dependent variable ( ), lagged real output growth 
( ), and the lagged value of the commercial loan 
spread ( ). The summary statistics on these 
and other variables that we use later are reported in the 
appendix (Table A1). From 1992 onward, we also have data on 
the net percentage of loan officers reporting strengthening 
demand for commercial loans in the previous quarter 
( ), the series plotted in Chart 3. Note that in the 
equation we are regressing loan growth in one quarter on the 





Since the data are available over relatively short subperiods, to 
conserve degrees of freedom we use only one lag of each 
variable. The short lag length is actually conservative, since the 
correlation between loan growth and standards is higher at 
longer lags (Table 1). 
The equation with demand and standards on the right-hand 
side is the complete specification since, in theory at least, 
changes in loan growth should reflect either changes in 
demand or changes in standards, that is, supply, or both. The 
question here is whether our survey measure of standards is a 
reasonable proxy for changes in standards and supply across 
the economy. If the actions of the loan officers surveyed match 
their words, and if loan officers across the country act likewise, 
reports of tighter standards should lead to slower loan growth. 
In terms of equation 1, we expect  . We would expect a 
positive sign on the lagged values of loans, output, and demand 
to the extent that these variables are good proxies for loan 
demand. Lagged loan spreads could enter with either sign, 
depending on whether they reflect mostly supply-side or 
mostly demand-side factors. 
Regression estimates over three distinct sample periods are 
reported in Table 2. Lagged loan growth is positive and 
significant in every specification, and the large coefficient 
indicates considerable momentum in the lending process. 
Lagged output growth is insignificant over the 1990s, but is 
significantly negative over 1973 to first-quarter 1984, contrary 
to expectations.10 The demand variable enters negatively over 
the 1990s sample period, but it is statistically insignificant. The 
b 0 <
The economy does seem to grow more 
slowly during periods in which bankers 
tighten credit standards; four of the past 
five recessions were preceded by sharply 
tighter standards.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2000 7
loan spread is highly significant and enters negatively in every 
regression, suggesting that increases in this spread are due 
more to reductions in loan supply than to increases in the 
demand for loans. 
What the regressions show, most importantly, is that the 
reports of tighter standards by loan officers are still associated 
with slower loan growth, even after controlling for other 
factors that affect loan growth. The standards variable enters 
negatively, as expected, and is significant at the 5 percent level 
or lower over every period and specification. 
With hindsight, the strong connection between credit 
standards and loan growth is not really surprising. Loan growth 
should depend on the supply of credit, and we suspect that the 
supply of loans depends on credit standards. More surprising 
is the result that standards matter even after we control for 
changes in loan rates or spreads. This finding supports the 
notion that bankers allocate loans not by simply raising and 
lowering rates, but by tightening and loosening other nonprice 
terms as well—the rationing concept that may have motivated 
the survey in the first place. 
Credit Standards 
and Economic Activity
Credit standards may be linked to economic activity for either 
of two reasons. To the extent that credit availability depends on 
lenders’ standards, a tightening of standards should cause a 
decline in spending by firms that depend on banks for credit. 
Tighter standards may also signal other disturbances that cause 
the economy to slow: lenders may batten down the hatches 
ahead of the storm. The causal impact of a change in standards 
and the signal provided by the change both imply a negative 
correlation between standards and economic activity. 
The economy does seem to grow more slowly during 
periods in which bankers tighten credit standards; four of the 
past five recessions were preceded by sharply tighter standards 
(Chart 4). The exception was the 1981-82 recession. Loan 
officers were loosening standards when that recession began, 
but they quickly tightened as the economy contracted. 
Table 2
Commercial Loan Growth and Credit Standards: 
Regression Equations over Various Periods
(1)
1990:3 – 1998:4 
(2)
1992:1 – 1998:4 
(3)
1973:3 – 1984:1 
C 9.203*** 10.879*** 12.618***
(5.167) (4.282) (3.618)
Loanst-1 0.803*** 0.798*** 0.523***
(0.080) (0.112) (0.102)
Outputt-1 0.280*** — -0.476***
(0.307) (0.219)
Demandt-1 — -0.029*** —
(0.048)
Standardst-1 -0.075*** -0.225*** -0.237***
(0.036) (0.067) (0.057)
Loan spreadt-1 -4.641*** -5.332*** -3.058***
(2.577) (2.309) (1.276)
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.902 0.595
BG test 1.007*** 0.942 2.478
Observations 34 28 43
Source: Data sources are in Table A2.
Notes: Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses). The dependent variable is quarterly growth (at an annual 
rate) in commercial and industrial loans at U.S. banks. In columns 1 
and 2, Standards is the net percentage of senior loan officers reporting 
tighter standards on large firms. Demand is the net percentage reporting 
stronger demand by large firms. Loan spread is the spread of the average 
commercial and industrial loan rate over the federal funds rate. For the 
earlier period (column 3), Standards is the average of the net percentage 
reporting tighter standards for making loans at the prime rate or above. 
Loan spread is the spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate.  
The BG test is the Breusch-Godfrey test for first-order autocorrelation.  
The test statistic is distributed Chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 3 reports regression equations relating quarterly 
growth in real GDP to its own lagged value and several other 
variables. The question is whether   provides any 
additional information, given these other variables. Separate 
regressions were estimated over the early years of the survey 
(1967-84) and the 1990s.11
The results for the early years show that standards help 
considerably in predicting GDP growth. Lagged growth by 
itself explains only about 5 percent of the variation in current 
growth. Adding   to the equation more than 
doubles the R2 (column 2), and   is statistically 
significant between the 1 and 5 percent levels.   
remains significant even when the equation includes two 
additional variables that have proved to be powerful 
forecasters: the federal funds rate and the spread between 
S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 –
rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills (column 3).12 
Adding these variables to the equation more than triples the 
adjusted R2. Nevertheless, knowing whether bank lenders 
recently tightened or loosened their standards for commercial 
credit still helps in predicting GDP growth.
These results are all at least as strong over the more 
recent period: third-quarter 1990 to fourth-quarter 1998. 
 is more significant over this period than it is over 
the earlier period, and the adjusted R2 for the equation with 
 is twice as high as it is for the regression without 
 (Table 3, columns 4 and 5).   
remains significant at 1 percent or better when we add lags 
of the funds rate and the paper-bill spread (column 3).13 
 wins the horse race over the more recent 
period—in fact, neither the funds rate nor the spread is 
S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 – S dards tan t1 –
S dards tan t1 –
Table 3
The Link between Commercial Credit Standards and Output Growth
1967:2 – 1984:1 1990:3 – 1998:4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C 2.255*** 3.212*** 10.666*** 1.439*** 2.748*** 2.920***
(0.658) (0.893) (1.875) (0.630) (0.481) (1.372)
Output  t-1 0.259*** 0.199*** -0.164 0.478*** 0.027 0.032
(0.100) (0.103) (0.110) (0.184) (0.147) (0.163)
Standards  t-1 — -0.067*** -0.072*** — -0.084*** -0.080***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.017) (0.027)
Federal funds rate  t-1 — —  0.262 — — -0.111
(0.384) (0.470)
Federal funds rate  t-2 — — -0.828*** ———
(0.433)
Paper-bill spread  t-1 — — -2.029 — — 0.874
(1.351) (3.719)
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.102 0.371 0.190 0.427 0.389
BG test 0.462 0.288 0.235 1.855 0.766 0.719
Observations 69 68 68 34 34 34
Source: Data sources are in Table A2.
Notes: Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable is quarterly growth (at an annual rate) in real GDP. 
Paper-bill spread is the spread between interest rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills. Specification tests called for the second lag of the federal funds 
rate in the column 3 regression. Standards is the net percentage of senior loan officers reporting tighter standards on large firms. For the earlier period 
(columns 1, 2, and 3), Standards is the average of the net percentage reporting tighter standards for making loans at the prime rate or above. The BG test is the 
Breusch-Godfrey test for first-order autocorrelation. The test statistic is distributed Chi-squared with one degree of freedom.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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individually significant, and the adjusted R2 with these 
variables included in the regression is lower.14 The fact that 
standards matter at least as much or more over this period 
provides no support for the view that the role of banks in 
economic activity diminished over the 1990s. 
Commercial Credit Standards 
and Business Activity
The regressions in Table 4 show that   helps to 
predict three narrower measures of business activity as well: 
S dards tan t1 –
investment in producers’ durables, the change in inventory 
investment, and industrial production.   is 
significant across the board, with or without the funds rate and 
the paper-bill spread. The adjusted R2 actually falls when these 
additional variables are included, suggesting that they add little 
information beyond that already contained in standards.
The connection between standards and inventories is 
especially notable, as inventory investment is notoriously 
unpredictable (Blinder and Maccini 1991). Inventory 
investment should vary with interest rates, but researchers have 
never found a strong link between them. This missing link has 
vexed business-cycle researchers because fluctuations in 
S dards tan t1 –
Table 4
Commercial Credit Standards and Business Activity 
Dependent Variable
Investment in Producers’ 
Durable Equipment Change in Business Inventories Industrial Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C 11.774*** 10.657*** 16.346*** 10.887 4.285*** 5.629***
(2.466) (6.093) (4.005) (13.693) (0.879) (2.166)
Depvart-1 -0.158 -0.182 0.518*** 0.511*** 0.130 0.144
(0.218) (0.231) (0.123) (0.137) (0.144) (0.146)
Standardst-1 -0.327*** -0.357*** -0.653*** -0.689*** -0.178*** -0.159***
(0.116) (0.149) (0.180) (0.287) (0.042) (0.046)
Federal funds ratet-1 — 1.162 — -2.237 — -0.332
(1.532) (3.499) (0.479)
Paper-bill spreadt-1 — -10.565 — 40.148 — 0.484
(13.371) (23.694) (5.115)
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.219 0.611 0.609 0.491 0.461
BG test 2.251 1.366 0.974 1.954 0.637 1.229
Observations 34 34 34 34 33 33
Source: Data sources are in Table A2.
Notes: Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables investment in producers’ durable equipment and 
industrial production are quarterly growth rates (at annual rates); change in business inventories is a quarterly change (at an annual rate). The equations in 
columns 5 and 6 include a second lag of the dependent variable (not reported). Paper-bill spread is the spread between interest rates on commercial paper 
and Treasury bills. Standards is the net percentage of senior loan officers reporting tighter standards on large firms. The BG test is the Breusch-Godfrey test 
for first-order autocorrelation. The test statistic is distributed Chi-squared with one degree of freedom. All equations are estimated from third-quarter 1990 
to fourth-quarter 1998.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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inventory investment account for a disproportionate share of 
fluctuations in GDP. In their study of the 1981-82 recession, 
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) suggest that “quantity 
rationing” by banks—that is, the allocation of loans through 
non-interest-rate terms—could explain the missing link. They 
find that during that recession the firms presumably most 
dependent on banks for credit—those without a lot of cash or 
a public bond rating—cut their inventory investment by 
substantially more than did the less bank-dependent firms. In 
the end, the authors attribute the inventory recession to tight 
“credit conditions” at banks. Our results seem roughly 
consistent.15
Vector Autoregression Analysis 
In contrast to the single equations estimated above, a VAR is a 
system of equations that lets us better control for the feedback 
between current and past levels of output, lending, and credit 
standards. Controlling for this feedback is crucial. Suppose 
lenders tighten standards in response to weakness in the 
economy, both past and present. It is really weak output 
driving up standards in that case, not the other way around. To 
crack this chicken-and-egg problem, a VAR lets every variable 
in the system depend on past values of itself and every other 
variable in the system. Given estimates of these interactions, we 
can identify the changes in credit standards that were not 
predicted by the other variables in the system. Running these 
unpredicted “shocks” back through the system traces the 
impact of a shock to standards to all the other variables, and 
vice versa. 
The core of our VAR, which is relatively standard, includes 
(in order): log real GDP, log GDP deflator, log commodity 
prices, and the federal funds rate. Note that these four variables 
make up a more or less complete model of the economy. Apart 
from output (real GDP) and prices (GDP deflator), we include 
commodity prices as a proxy for supply-side disturbances (like 
oil shocks). The federal funds rate provides a measure of 
interest rates that is tied particularly closely to the stance of 
monetary policy.16 We tack two more variables to the end of 
the system:  the log of commercial bank loans and the change 
in commercial credit standards. Placing standards last in the 
VAR tends to minimize their impact on output and the other 
variables. The VAR includes four lags of each variable above. 
We estimate the model jointly over the two periods in which we 
have data on loans and credit standards: first-quarter 1974 to 
fourth-quarter 1984 and second-quarter 1990 to fourth-
quarter 1998.
Chart 5 shows the shock to standards and the subsequent 
dynamics. The initial increase in the net percentage of loan 
officers reporting tightening standards is about 8 percentage 
points. Lenders continue to tighten (at diminishing rates) for 
about a year after the initial shock. Nearly two years pass before 
lenders ease standards significantly, and the easing 
commencing then is relatively gradual compared with the 
tightening over preceding quarters.17 Credit crunches appear 
more abrupt than credit expansions.
Chart 6 shows how shocks to other variables in the system 
affect credit standards. Standards seem largely independent of 
the other variables in the system. Shocks to commodity prices 
and the federal funds rate cause some tightening of standards, 
but the impact is short and barely significant. These findings 
suggest that lenders set their standards based largely on their 
own lending capacity and on their expectations, so that 
standards appear to be relatively exogenous to the other 
macroeconomic variables included in the system.
Conclusion
Off and on since 1967, the Federal Reserve has surveyed loan 
officers at a small sample of large banks about their commercial 
credit standards. The idea behind the survey is that the 
availability of bank credit depends not just on interest rates, 
but on credit standards as well.  Notwithstanding the small and 
changing sample, the checkered pattern of questions, and the 
sometimes curious responses of lenders, the reports are 
informative. The changes in standards that they report help to 
predict both commercial bank lending and GDP, even after 
controlling for past economic conditions and interest rates. 
Standards matter even in the 1990s, when capital markets were 
supposed to have eclipsed the role of banks in the economy. 
Changes in standards also help to predict narrower measures of 
business activity, where commercial credit availability from 
banks seems most crucial. The connection between bank 
standards and inventories is especially promising, because 
inventory investment is notoriously unpredictable and heavily 
bank dependent. 
A shock to credit standards and its aftermath very much 
resemble a “credit crunch.” Loan officers tighten standards 
very sharply for a few quarters, but ease up only gradually: two 
to three years pass before standards are back to their initial 
level. Commercial loans at banks plummet immediately after 
the tightening in standards and continue to fall until lenders 
ease up. Output falls as well, and the federal funds rate, which 
we identify with the stance of monetary policy, is lowered. 
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Quarters after shock
Source: Authors’ VAR analysis using data sources in Table A2.
Notes: Plotted is the impact on each variable of a one-standard-deviation tightening in commercial credit standards by banks. The dashed lines indicate
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Quarters after shock
Source: Authors’ VAR analysis using data sources in Table A2.
Notes: Plotted is the impact of a one-standard-deviation shock in each variable on commercial credit standards by banks. The dashed lines indicate
95 percent confidence levels.
Commercial and industrial loan shock
Quarters after shock








Loans Quarterly growth in commercial  and industrial loans 
(annual rate, 1973:3-1984:1)
44 9.959 8.479 -9.233 30.128
Loans (1990:3-1998:4) 34 4.253 8.775 -10.964 18.230
Output Quarterly growth in real GDP (annual rate, 1967:2-1984:1) 69 3.025 4.703 -9.300 16.100
Output (1990:3-1998:4) 34 2.626 2.276 -4.000 6.100
Industrial production Quarterly growth in industrial production (annual rate) 34 3.504 3.612 -8.415 9.641
Business inventories Quarterly change in business inventories (annual rate) 34 30.803 28.593 -27.800 91.400
Producers’ durable  Quarterly growth in investment in producers’ durable 
equipment (annual rate) 
34 9.646 9.382 -14.957 34.214
Demand Net percentage of domestic banks reporting stronger demand 
over the previous quarter
28 12.809 15.452 -26.500 38.100
Standards Net percentage of domestic banks reporting tighter standards 
over the previous quarter.  During 1978-83, Standards is 
computed by averaging changes in credit standards on loans 
at prime and loans above prime (1967:2-1983:4)
67 12.175 18.792 -30.833 76.613
Standards (1990:3-1998:4) 34 1.656 16.416 -19.450 48.900
Federal funds rate (1967:2-1984:1) 69 8.352 3.610 3.550 17.790
Federal funds rate (1990:3-1998:4) 34 4.984 1.294 2.990 8.160
Paper-bill spread Spread of the nonfinancial commercial paper rate over the 
secondary market T-bill rate. The spread was computed using 
six-month rates until 1971 and three-month rates from 1971 
to 1998 (1967:2-1984:1)
69 0.842 0.617 0.030 3.510
Paper-bill spread (1990:3-1998:4) 34 0.435 0.155 0.180 0.910
Loan spread Spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate 
(1973:3-1984:1)
44 1.554 0.994 -1.440 3.720
Loan spread Spread of the commercial and industrial loan rate over the 
federal funds rate (1990:3-1998:4)
34 1.836 0.224 1.440 2.320
Paper-loan mix Quarterly growth in the ratio of nonfinancial commercial 
paper outstanding to the sum of nonfinancial commercial 
paper outstanding and commercial and industrial bank loans 
(1973:2-1983:4)
39 11.076 29.200 -45.397 81.706
Reports of eased credit Net percentage of small firms that borrow money at least 
once every three months reporting “easier credit” compared 
with three months ago (1974:1-1983:4)
35 -7.629 6.174 -28.000 1.000
Paper-loan mix (1990:2-1998:4) 31 1.979 10.629 -18.471 24.860
Reports of eased credit (1990:2-1998:4) 31 -5.452 2.815 -11.000 -1.000
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Table A2 
Data Sources
Variable Definition Data Source
Loans Quarterly growth in commercial 
and industrial loans (annual rate)
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H.8:  Assets and Liabilities of 
Commercial  Banks in the U.S. (seasonally adjusted and break-adjusted, 
in millions of dollars) 
Output Quarterly growth in real GDP 
(annual rate)
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business
(seasonally adjusted annual rate, in billions of dollars)
Industrial production Quarterly growth in industrial production 
(annual rate)
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release G.17:  Industrial Production 
and Capacity Utilization (seasonally adjusted, 1992=100)
Business inventories Quarterly change in business inventories 
(annual rate)a
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business 
(seasonally adjusted annual rate, in billions of dollars)
Producers’ durable Quarterly growth in investment in producers’ 
durable equipment (annual rate)b
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business 
(seasonally adjusted annual rate, in billions of dollars)
Demand Net percentage of domestic banks reporting 
stronger demand over the previous quarter
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey
Standards Net percentage of domestic banks reporting 
tighter standards over the previous quarter 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey
Federal funds rate Effective overnight interbank lending rate Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates 
Paper-bill spread Spread of the nonfinancial commercial paper rate 
over the secondary market T-bill  rate.  The spread 
was computed using six-month rates until 1971 
and three-month rates from 1971 to 1998
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates  
Loan spread Spread of the prime rate over the federal funds 
rate (1973:3-1984:1) 
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates 
Loan spread Spread of the commercial and industrial loan rate 
over the federal funds rate (1990:3-1998:4)
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release E.2: Survey of  Terms of 
Business Lending (for commercial and industrial loan rate). See above 
for federal funds rate
Paper-loan mix Quarterly growth in the ratio of nonfinancial 
commercial paper outstanding to the sum of 
nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding and 
commercial and industrial bank loans
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release: Commercial Paper 
(for nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding). See above for 
commercial and industrial bank loans
Reports of eased credit Net percentage of small firms that borrow money 
at least once every three months reporting “easier 
credit” compared with three months ago
National Federation of Independent Business, Small Business 
Economic Survey
a This variable is now referred to as “private inventory” in the source data.
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1. Academics interested in the credit effects of monetary policy—the 
theory that changes in policy affect spending partly through changes 
in the supply of bank loans—will want to know if the reports on bank 
credit standards are a reliable proxy for bank loan supply.
2. See Schreft and Owens (1991) for more on the history of and 
revisions to the survey. For current and recent surveys, see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey. 
3. The Survey of Terms of Business Lending collects quantitative 
information on commercial loan rates and other lending terms at 
banks.
4. Weighting the responses over the 1990s by the extent of change 
(“somewhat,” versus “considerably”) did not change the picture or the 
results, nor did using a diffusion index. Integrating the changes 
reported by lenders over time did not work as well as any of the other 
measures.
5. This apparent bias toward reporting tightening in these early years 
could reflect bankers reporting standards relative to some long-term 
notion. Alternatively, bankers may not have reported easier standards 
for fear of scrutiny by regulators. Bankers need not have feared the 
regulator’s club, however, since the responses of individual bankers 
are viewed as highly confidential and would not be shared with 
supervisory personnel except under extreme circumstances. 
6. The availability doctrine has waned since the deregulation of 
interest rates and the accord that relieved the Federal Reserve of an 
obligation to support bond prices. See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) 
for references to the availability doctrine (p. 486) and quantity 
rationing (pp. 479-88, 492-3). 
7. The peak correlation between loan growth and standards in both 
periods is at six quarters (not shown in the table). 
8. Since 1992, loan officers have been asked how the demand for 
commercial and industrial loans has changed over the preceding three 
months (apart from normal seasonal variation). The multiple-choice 
answers enable them to identify demand as substantially stronger, 
moderately stronger, about the same, moderately weaker, or 
substantially weaker. 
9. We include only loans at U.S. banks, as the survey responses 
discussed above were from loan officers at domestic banks. Loan 
officers at branches and agencies of foreign banks are questioned 
separately. We use nominal loan growth in the analysis as a proxy for 
what we would like to use—the real value of new credit extensions, 
which is unavailable. The results are quite similar when real loan 
growth is used as the proxy instead. For a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of each measure, see Bernanke and Lown 
(1991, p. 209).
10. The negative sign over this period suggests a countercyclical 
demand for bank credit. Although on the surface this finding appears 
to be contrary to expectations, previous researchers have obtained 
similar results while exploring other issues, arguing that firms may 
have a greater need for financing as the economy begins to slow 
(see, for example, Bernanke and Blinder [1992]). 
11. The regressions for the earlier period go back farther than the loan 
growth regressions because we have a longer time series on GDP 
growth.
12. Positive shocks to the funds rate are thought to reflect tighter 
monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder 1992), while a higher paper-
bill spread may signal policy shocks as well as other, adverse shocks to 
financial markets (Friedman and Kuttner 1992). Specification tests 
called for the second lag of the funds rate.
13. The second lag of the funds rate was insignificant and was not 
necessary to reduce autocorrelation, so we dropped it from the 
regression. 
14. Friedman and Kuttner (1998) also found that the spread did not 
forecast well in the 1990s. In addition, when the regression is extended 
to include the mix variable—the ratio of commercial paper to 
commercial paper plus bank loans—this variable is not significant. 
However, the mix variable is significant in explaining GDP growth 
over the earlier time period. 
15. Eckstein and Sinai (1986) go further. They contend that all six 
of the recessions between 1957 and 1982 were caused by “credit 
crunches.” 
16. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998).
17. These fluctuations make sense, as lenders are reporting changes in 
standards; a change in one direction eventually requires an opposite 
and equal change to return to the initial level. Lenders seem to jerk the 
tail hard, and they relax their grip very gradually. References
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